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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of a ‘no deal’ or ‘hard’ Brexit on the recognition
of insolvency proceedings commenced in the UK by the remaining Member States
of the European Union (EU) post-Brexit. The paper considers the framework
currently implemented by the Recast European Insolvency Regulation and the
possible approaches when it will cease to apply to proceedings commenced
post-Brexit. The paper identiﬁes that there will be no overarching framework in
the event that ‘no deal’ is reached between the UK and the EU for post-Brexit
arrangements, resulting in reliance on individual Member States’ domestic laws
to determine recognition of insolvency proceedings commenced in the UK. The
paper sets out the contrasting approaches of ﬁve of the UK’s key trading partners
in the EU: France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain. The paper
concludes that UK insolvency proceedings will not be recognised in a consistent
manner in these Member States, which will be detrimental to stakeholders in,
and ultimately the economies of, the UK and these Member States. In doing so,
the paper underlines the importance of an agreement being reached between the
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I. Introduction
‘Brexit means Brexit’ as Theresa May famously announced when launching her
campaign to become leader of the Conservative Party in June 2016.1 Yet quite
what that means has been the subject of much debate in academia and beyond
since. As we move towards the UK’s departure from the European Union (EU),
following the triggering of Article 50 of Treaty of the European Union in March
2017, there remains a lack of certainty as to the nature of the future relationship
between the two post-Brexit. With so many important aspects of social and
commercial policy at stake, it is easy for the apparently less signiﬁcant issue of
cross-border insolvency to be overlooked in these discussions. This would be a
mistake, however, given the signiﬁcant role that a reliable system of insolvency
law has on inward investment, an issue of signiﬁcant importance as the UK seeks
to build trading partnerships beyond the remaining 27 EU Member States.
According to the March 2018 Consultation Insolvency and Corporate Governance,
‘[t]he UK has a leading international reputation for being a dependable place in
which to do business’.2 This reputation is in part credited to the insolvency regime,
which is an ‘important part of the UK’s business environment and is well regarded
internationally’.3 Conﬁdence in the reliability of a state’s insolvency law framework
is acknowledged as a key factor in general investment conﬁdence.4 As such, any
changes which may undermine conﬁdence should be made with utmost caution.
The UK Government appears to be adopting a negotiating position whereby
it can walk away from Brexit negotiations without having concluded a deal with
the EU.5 As the deadline draws closer, and the prospect of a ‘no deal’ or ‘hard’
Brexit seemingly increases, it is pertinent to consider the impact of a ‘no deal’
scenario on the resolution of cross-border insolvencies involving UK companies
operating in the EU. This paper will consider the current cross-border insol-
vency framework in the EU, the impact on this of a ‘no deal’ Brexit from a
UK perspective and in turn the manner in which cross-border aspects of UK
insolvency proceedings would be dealt with in some of the UK’s key trading
partners in the EU in the event of such a ‘hard’ Brexit. The paper will conclude
that the consequences of such an outcome are potentially dire, for the UK and
1. See, for example, Jessica Elgot and Rowena Mason,
“Theresa May launches Tory leadership bid with
pledge to unite country” (The Guardian, 30 June 2016),
available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/poli-
tics/2016/jun/30/theresa-may-launches-tory-leader-
ship-bid-with-pledge-to-unite-country>.
2. Department of Business, Energy and Industrial
Strategy, Insolvency and Corporate Governance (Consultation
Paper 2018), 5.
3. Ibid.
4. See, for example, the World Bank doing business re-
ports, in which resolving insolvency is one of the 10 fac-
tors considered; see also HMG, Providing a Cross-border
Civil Judicial Cooperation Framework – A Future Partnership
Paper (2017) (“Judicial Cooperation Future Partnership
Paper”), paragraphs 9–20.
5. See, for example, “Brexit: Bill approved after May
sees off rebellion” (BBC News, 20 June 2018), available
at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-
44542156>.
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the remaining Member States, and as such, it is crucial that a suitable solution
is arrived at.
II. The Current Framework
In order to understand the impact of Brexit on cross-border insolvency proceedings, it
is necessary to establish the current system operating in the EU to draw comparison
with the possible post-Brexit landscape. Insolvency proceedings involving companies
with their centre of main interests (COMIs) located in an EU Member State (other
than Denmark) are governed by Regulation (EU) 2015/848 on Insolvency Proceed-
ings (Recast EIR), which replaced the earlier Regulation (EC) 1346/2000 on Insol-
vency Proceedings (EIR 2000) with effect from 26 June 2017.6 The provisions of
the Recast EIR and its application are quite nuanced.7 It is not the purpose of this pa-
per to review these in detail but rather to understand the operation of the Recast EIR
in cross-border insolvencies to be able to draw comparison with post-Brexit systems.
TheRecast EIRdoes not harmonise insolvency law acrossMember States but rather
establishes rules on the jurisdiction to commence insolvency proceedings and the law
that applies to such proceedings. Where a company has its COMI in the UK, only
the UK will have the jurisdiction to open main insolvency proceedings, such as admin-
istration.8 These insolvency proceedings would then be governed by UK law in all re-
spects, save for some exceptions including security interests and rights under contracts
of employment in other Member States.9 Additionally, but signiﬁcantly, any appoint-
ment will be recognised automatically in all other Member States, and the insolvency
practitioner will be able to exercise all powers, subject to limited exceptions.10
Similarly, any insolvency proceedings commenced in anotherMember Statewill be au-
tomatically recognised in theUK together with the insolvency practitioners’ powers. As
such, the Recast EIR has both outbound and inbound effects in each Member State.
Under this system, if, for example, an administrator is appointed over a company
having its COMI in the UK pursuant to paragraph 22 of Schedule B1 of the Insol-
vency Act 1986, the appointment should automatically be recognised across the
EU. In turn, the administrator will be able to exercise the powers afforded to it by
the Insolvency Act 1986, subject to the limited exceptions considered above.11 This
has clear beneﬁts, with the moratorium pursuant to paragraphs 42–43 of Schedule
6. Denmark exercised its right not to be party to the
EIR 2000 or the Recast EIR. Consequently, hereafter
references to the EU and Member States in the context
of cross-border insolvency proceedings will be read as
excluding Denmark.
7. COMI is not deﬁned within the Recast EIR, al-
though guidance is found in Article 3 and Preamble
paragraphs 28–32. Insolvency proceedings are deﬁned
in Annex A of the Recast EIR and include administra-
tion, company voluntary arrangements, creditors’ vol-
untary liquidation and compulsory winding up from
the UK.
8. Article 3(1) and Annex A, Regulation (EU) 2015/
848 of 20 May 2015 on Insolvency Proceedings (Re-
cast) OJ L 141/19 (“the Recast EIR”).
9. Ibid., Articles 7–18.
10. Ibid., Articles 19–21. Automatic recognition of the
appointment is subject only to public policy, while ex-
ercise of powers will only be limited by secondary or
territorial proceedings being opened in the Member
State and the provisions of Articles 8 and 10.
11. Although the scope of the deﬁnitions within the
Recast EIR allows for recognition of out-of-court ad-
ministration appointments, where an administration is
likely to involve signiﬁcant extra-territorial aspects,
the administrator will often be appointed by court or-
der pursuant to paragraph 12, Schedule B1, Insolvency
Act 1986, to facilitate the recognition of the insolvency
proceedings in other Member States.
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B1 coming into immediate effect and the administrator able to exercise its full range
of powers immediately. This can prevent the dissipation of valuable assets, allow the
administrator to continue the business of the insolvent company or even facilitate a
pre-packaged administration allowing for the continuation of the business under
new ownership. Such is the appeal of the latter option that companies have in the past
shifted their COMI to the UK in order to undergo a pre-packaged administration,
the effects of which are recognised throughout the EU.12 This additional beneﬁt of
pre-packaged administrations was noted in the 2014 Graham Review.13
These provisions offer certainty for all parties affected by the company’s
insolvency, allowing the insolvency practitioner to act promptly without incurring
cost or delay, to achieve the best possible outcome for the company and its
creditors without unnecessary waste. It is pertinent to consider, therefore, how
this will be affected by Brexit.
III. The Framework Post-Brexit
While the nature of the relationship between the UK and the EU post-Brexit is cur-
rently unknown, the UK Government has made it clear it ‘wants to build a new,
deep and special partnership with the European Union’14 and has published seven
Future Partnership Papers to this end.15 Cooperation in cross-border insolvency
proceedings is addressed, albeit ﬂeetingly, in the future partnership paper Providing
a Cross-border Civil Judicial Cooperation Framework. In essence, the UK Government is
seeking to preserve the existing beneﬁts, but outside of the direct jurisdiction of
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), recognising that:
Businesses and investors value certainty. The EU and the UK will continue to be key
trading partners and to invest in each other’s economies. Conﬁdence in cross-border
commercial contracts and investment relationships is underpinned and enhanced
by clear rules governing: … [inter alia] the approach to managing insolvency in cross-
border situations.16
This position has been reiterated in the UK Government’s presentation Frame-
work for the UK–EU Partnership: Civil Judicial Cooperation. The presentation, one of a
number to form part of discussions with the EU around the future relationship,
echoes the message of the Future Partnership Paper that ‘[b] usinesses and credi-
tors value the certainty of predictable and efﬁcient cross-border insolvency rules’.17
12. See, for example, Re Hellas Telecommunications (Lux-
embourg) II SCA [2009] EWHC 3199 (Ch).
13. Teresa Graham, Graham Review into Pre-pack Adminis-
tration: Report to the Rt Hon Vince Cable MP (The Insol-
vency Service, June 2014), available at: <www.gov.
uk/government/publications/graham-review-into-
pre-pack-administration>, paragraph 3.7.
14. Judicial Cooperation Future Partnership Paper,
above note 4, 1.
15. Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/
collections/article-50-and-negotiations-with-the-
eu#future-partnership-papers>.
16. Judicial Cooperation Future Partnership Paper,
above note 4, paragraph 14.
17. HMG, Framework for the UK–EU Partnership: Civil Ju-
dicial Cooperation (2018) (“Framework Presentation”),
14. The case study presented is, however, ﬂawed from
an EU perspective, as it overlooks the continuation of
the Recast EIR between remaining Member States
and the availability of alternative recognition proce-
dures in the UK, as considered in Part IV below.
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The wish for preservation, for the most part, of the status quo is reﬂected in the
European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (Withdrawal Act),18 which received
Royal Assent on 26 June 2018 following a much-debated passage through
Parliament. Section 3 of the Withdrawal Act provides that all direct EU legislation
in operation immediately before ‘exit day’ will form part of domestic law once the
UK leaves the EU.19 As a consequence of this provision being enacted, the Recast
EIR would be added to the statute book. This would not, however, ensure the
preservation of current arrangements. In such a situation, the UK would continue
to recognise insolvency proceedings commenced in EU Member States. As a piece
of UK rather than EU legislation, however, the provisions would not be binding on
those Member States. As such, proceedings commenced in the UK would not be
recognised by the remaining Member States. Such reciprocity could only be
achieved by way of treaty or international convention between the UK and the
EU. It would not be possible for the UK to agree bilateral agreements with
individual Member States, given the prohibition on such arrangements in the
European Council’s guidelines for Brexit negotiations.20
The EU addressed the issue of cross-border insolvency, again brieﬂy, in its
Draft Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (EU Draft
Withdrawal Agreement).21 Jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judicial
decisions, and related cooperation between central authorities are addressed in
Article 63, which states the EU’s intention that the Recast EIR would continue
to apply to insolvency proceedings opened before the end of any transition
period.22 With much of the EU Draft Withdrawal Agreement to be agreed
following several rounds of negotiations, this provision was agreed following
the June 2018 round of negotiations with a minor amendment extending to
proceedings under Article 6(1) of the Recast EIR.23 Importantly though, there
is no consideration of the relationship post-Brexit in the EU Draft Withdrawal
Agreement.
With fundamental issues such as the Irish border and EU citizens’ rights yet to
be agreed, not to mention the thorny issue of the role of the CJEU in any arrange-
ment, agreement on the coordination of cross-border insolvency post-Brexit would
18. European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018.
19. Ibid., Section 3. ‘Exit day’ is deﬁned in Section
20(1) as 29 March 2019 at 11.00 p.m.
20. European Commission, Guidelines Following the
United Kingdom’s Notiﬁcation under Article 50 TEU (EUCO
XT 20004/17) (“EU Guidelines”), paragraph 2, avail-
able at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/
21763/29-euco-art50-guidelinesen.pdf>. This reﬂects
the position of the CJEU generally that once an EU
Regulation on judicial cooperation (and other matters)
is issued, the external competence to determine inter-
national agreements with third countries is exclusive
to the EU, not individual Member States. This is not
therefore exclusive to the UK in the context of Brexit.
21. European Commission, Draft Agreement on the With-
drawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic En-
ergy Community, COM TF50 (2018) 35 (“EU Draft
Withdrawal Agreement”), available at: <https://ec.
europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/ﬁles/
draft_agreement_coloured.pdf>.
22. Ibid., Article 63.
23. Ibid., Article 63(3)(c), as set out in the ‘Joint State-
ment from the Negotiators of The European Union
and The United Kingdom Government on Progress
of Negotiations under Article 50 TEU on The United
Kingdom’s Orderly Withdrawal from The European
Union’ (19 June 2018), available at: <https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/sys-
tem/uploads/attachment_data/ﬁle/717697/Joint_
Statement_-_19_June_2018.pdf>.
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seem some way off. While the so-called Henry VIII powers in Section 8 of the
Withdrawal Act could be used to unpick any one-way recognition in the absence
of reciprocity,24 the issue of recognition of cross-border insolvency proceedings still
needs to be addressed.
IV. Alternative Options for Recognition
If the current arrangements for cross-border insolvency proceedings pursuant to
the Recast EIR cannot be retained, it is pertinent ﬁrst to consider the availability
of any existing international arrangements that could ﬁll the gap. This part will
consider whether the UK may be able to rely on alternative existing frameworks
for the recognition of proceedings initiated in the UK post-Brexit.
The obvious starting point would be the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency (Model Law). Incorporated into UK law through the Cross-
Border Insolvency Regulations 2006,25 other Member States would be able to take
advantage of its provisions in gaining recognition of insolvency proceedings in the
UK. The outbound beneﬁts for the UK are, however, limited. To date, The
Model Law has only been adopted by four other Member States—Greece,
Poland, Romania and Slovenia26—none of which could be considered a key trad-
ing partner of the UK.27 Furthermore, while The Model Law provides a clear
pathway for recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings, this recognition is not
automatic as with the Recast EIR but requires application to a local court to gain
recognition and relief.28 As such, The Model Law is unlikely to offer much suc-
cour, unless other Member States introduce it in the near future. Only 44 states
have adopted The Model Law globally since its introduction in 1997, however,
and this has tended to form part of a larger review of domestic law. With the pres-
ence of the Recast EIR, and Member States’ focus on harmonisation rather than
individual reform,29 such hope would appear optimistic.30
24. Section 8, European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. These have been referred to as ‘Henry VIII powers’ due
to the ability for ministers to amend or repeal UK statute through secondary legislation without recourse to Par-
liament, a reference to Henry VIII’s purported preference for legislating by proclamation rather than through
Parliament. For more, see <https://www.parliament.uk/site-information/glossary/henry-viii-clauses/>.
25. SI 1030/2006.
26. See <http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_status.html>. Although
not adopting The Model Law, as seen in Part X below, Spain has adopted provisions similar to those enshrined
in The Model Law.
27. The countries rank 10th (Poland), 17th (Greece), 18th (Romania) and 24th (Slovenia) in terms of value of trade
with EU Member States, for which see:<https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/
balanceofpayments/datasets/9geographicalbreakdownofthecurrentaccountthepinkbook2016>.
28. General Assembly Resolution 52/158, Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency of the United Nations Com-
mission on International Trade Law A/RES/52/158 (30 January 1998), Article 15.
29. See, for example, European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of The European Parliament and of The
Council on preventive restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efﬁciency of
restructuring, insolvency and discharge procedures and amending Directive 2012/30/EU (COM (2016) 723 ﬁnal).
30. UNCITRAL Working Group V has produced a draft model law for the recognition and enforcement of in-
solvency-related judgments that was considered at its 53rd session in New York (7–11 May 2018). While this
would not assist with the recognition of insolvency proceedings, it may offer some assistance with issues arising
within insolvency proceedings if approved by UNCITRAL and subsequently incorporated by Member States.
For details of the progress of the draft model law on recognition and enforcement of insolvency-related judgments,
see <http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/5Insolvency.html>.
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An alternative could be reliance on judicial cooperation. There is a long history
of judicial cooperation involving the UK courts in cross-border and extra-territo-
rial insolvency matters, seen in cases such as Maxwell Communication Corpora-
tion and more recently the fallout from the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Such
cooperation would need to be fostered with Member States’ domestic courts for
this to be a viable alternative. The beneﬁts of such an approach are recognised
in the May 2017 amendments to the 2016 Chancery Guide, which states that
‘communication between courts in different jurisdictions may be of assistance in
the efﬁcient conduct of cross-border insolvency cases’ and that a co-ordinated ap-
proach can lead to ‘maximisation of beneﬁt for all stakeholders of ﬁnancially trou-
bled enterprises’.31 The requirement for multiple proceedings for such an
approach would represent a signiﬁcant step backwards from the current stream-
lined and efﬁcient provisions of the Recast EIR. Such an approach would add cost
and delay, and it is not even certain that proceedings would or could be opened in
other Member States. With the restriction on secondary or territorial proceedings
subject to presence of an establishment in the other Member State removed once
the UK is no longer a Member State,32 opening such proceedings will be subject to
local law.
The Chancery Guide endorses three sets of international guidelines on judicial
cooperation, of which the EU Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-Court Coopera-
tion Principles (EU JudgeCo Principles),33 which operate as non-binding guidance
to all Member States, are most relevant here.34 Although principally targeting
cross-border insolvency proceedings covered by the Recast EIR, the EU JudgeCo
Principles extend beyond Member States. Courts and insolvency practitioners are
encouraged to communicate and cooperate in international cases that do not fall
under the Recast EIR, in which case they ‘should apply the EU JudgeCo Principles
by way of analogy’.35
The EU JudgeCo Principles have the overriding objective of ‘enabling courts
and insolvency practitioners to operate effectively and efﬁciently in international
insolvency cases with the goals of maximising the value of the debtor’s global assets,
preserving where appropriate the debtor’s business’ with due regard to creditors’
interests.36 Direct court access for foreign insolvency practitioners is also encour-
aged,37 which would remove the need for multiple proceedings, although would
be subject to UK proceedings ﬁrst being recognised in the relevant Member States.
Importantly, in respect of the concerns of cost and delay if the beneﬁts of the
31. Chancery Guide (HM Courts & Tribunals Service,
2016), paragraph 25.29.
32. Articles 3(2) and 3(4), Recast EIR, only apply
where a company’s COMI is in another Member
State.
33. Bob Wessels (ed), EU Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-
Court Cooperation Principles (Eleven International Publish-
ing, 2015) (“EU JudgeCo Principles”), available at:
<http://www.tri-leiden.eu/uploads/ﬁles/eu-cross-
border-insolvency-court-to-court-cooperation-
principlespdf.pdf>.
34. See Chancery Guide, paragraph 25.30. The Chan-
cery Guide also promotes the American Law Institute/
International Insolvency Institute Guidelines Applica-
ble to Court-to-Court Communications in Cross-Bor-
der Cases and The Judicial Insolvency Network
Guidelines for Communication and Cooperation be-
tween Courts in Cross-Border Insolvency Matters.
35. Principle 26, EU JudgeCo Principles.
36. Ibid., Principle 3.
37. Ibid., Principle 13.
UK Insolvency Proceedings in a No Deal Brexit
Int. Insolv. Rev. (2018)
DOI: 10.1002/iir
Recast EIR are not available for UK proceedings post-Brexit, the aims expressly
include saving costs and expense while ensuring cases are dealt with effectively, ef-
ﬁciently and in a timely manner.38 The EU JudgeCo Principles also encourage the
use of a moratorium ‘at the earliest possible time in each State where the debtor
has assets or where litigation is pending’ even where local law does not make such
provision.39
While not a perfect solution, the EU JudgeCo Principles may offer some opti-
mism in the event of no Brexit deal being reached in the absence of any recogni-
tion framework or treaties.40 While UK proceedings would need to gain
recognition in other Member States, compliance by those Member States with
the EU JudgeCo Principles would see decisions made in a timely and cost-effective
manner in the best interests of the creditors.
V. The Impact of a ‘Hard’ Brexit
One of the most signiﬁcant beneﬁts of the Recast EIR to cross-border insolvency
proceedings is the automatic recognition of proceedings commenced in another
Member State. In the event of the UK leaving the EU without some form of treaty
to mirror the existing provisions of the Recast EIR, there does not appear to be any
suitable overarching framework in place that will ﬁll this void. As a consequence,
recognition of insolvency proceedings opened in the UK will be subject to the pri-
vate international law of individual Member States. This will lead to two possible
options for insolvency practitioners: ﬁrst, seeking to open ancillary proceedings in
other Member States and then seeking coordination of these proceedings; or sec-
ond, seeking recognition of UK proceedings in accordance with Member States’
local law.
This raises the question of how insolvency proceedings commenced in the UK
following a ‘hard’ Brexit would be treated by individual Member States. It would
not be possible to address the approach of all 26 Member States still subject to the
Recast EIR in this paper. Instead, the paper will consider the likely approach of
ﬁve of the UK’s key trading partners: France, Germany, Ireland, the
Netherlands and Spain.41 The paper will now consider on what basis collective in-
solvency proceedings commenced in the UK in respect of a company with its
38. Ibid., Principle 4.3.
39. Ibid., Principle 8.
40. There has been some discussion of the resurrection of the European Convention on Certain International As-
pects of Bankruptcy 1990 (Council of Europe Treaty number 136) (“Istanbul Convention”) as an alternative to the
Recast EIR post-Brexit. See, for example, “Brexit and the Future of European Insolvency: Discussion between G
Moss Q.C. and Professor B Wessels” (European Law Academy, Trier, 8 June 2017) (notes available at: <http://
www.bobwessels.nl/blog/2017-06-doc4-eu-insolvency-law-after-brexit/>). On the basis that the UK was not a
signatory to the Istanbul Convention, it was never formally ratiﬁed by sufﬁcient members to come into force
and has been superseded by the Recast EIR (see Article 85(1)(k)), furtherance of this discussion is beyond the scope
of this article.
41. The countries rank ﬁrst (Germany), second (France), third (the Netherlands), fourth (Ireland) and seventh
(Spain) in terms of value of trade with EU Member States. See <https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/
nationalaccounts/balanceofpayments/datasets/9geographicalbreakdownofthecurrentaccountthepinkbook2016>
International Insolvency Review
Int. Insolv. Rev. (2018)
DOI: 10.1002/iir
COMI in the UK would be recognised under the domestic law of these ﬁve Mem-
ber States.
VI. France42
In France, it would ﬁrst be necessary to establish that the ﬁnding of COMI in the
UK was supported by the facts. Given that the mutual respect and sincere cooper-
ation principles underlying European texts, such as the Recast EIR, would no lon-
ger be applicable as of right,43 the existence of foreign proceedings would not place
any limits on a French court being able to conduct insolvency proceedings in re-
spect of a foreign business. In general, a French court would be competent to ex-
ercise jurisdiction where, in the case of a foreign business, its ‘principal interests’
are located within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.44
Jurisdiction would also extend to the situation where the business operates in
France via a branch or other presence without legal personality.45 In such cases,
the court would examine the reality of the business’ operations, especially if it
thinks that the centre of interests is in France.46 Even without a centre of interests,
French courts have historically acceded to creditors’ petitions to open insolvency
proceedings, often on the basis of any connecting factors they deem important.47
This type of jurisdiction rests on the ‘exorbitant jurisdiction’ principles of the Civil
Code.48 Although this liberal jurisprudence has on occasion been curbed,49 courts
have held that parties are not free to contract out of exorbitant jurisdiction rules.50
On the assumption that the COMI is indisputably in the UK, the approach of
the French court would be to ﬁrst examine whether there was any international
text applicable to cross-border recognition and enforcement that could be invoked.
As identiﬁed above, France has not adopted The Model Law, despite recommen-
dations in this direction.51 Similarly, the few treaties that exist between France and
other countries do not involve the UK.52 Therefore, recourse to the droit commun
(ordinary law) and the exéquatur53 procedure will be necessary to register a foreign
judgment opening insolvency proceedings.54
An exéquatur is necessary because, while the probative value of the foreign judg-
ment or the right of the foreign ofﬁce-holder to manage the insolvency might be
acknowledged by a French court, without the formal exéquatur procedure, this
might not produce any effect on the debtor or assets situated in France. As a result,
creditors in France could still exercise any rights against the debtor, including suing
42. This section was provided by Paul Omar, Editor,
International Insolvency Review.
43. Article 4(3), Treaty on European Union [2012] OJ
C 326.
44. Article R. 600–1, Commercial Code.
45. CA Paris, 8 July 1992, RJ. Com. 1993, 7.
46. Cassation civile, 21 July 1987, Dalloz 1988, 169.
47. Cassation commerciale, 26 October 1999, Case
no. 96–12946 (unpublished).
48. Articles 14–15, Civil Code.
49. Cassation commerciale, 23 May 2006, Dalloz
2006, 1880.
50. Cassation commerciale, 1 July 2009, Judgement
no. 771, available at: <https://www.courdecassation.
fr/jurisprudence_2/premiere_chambre_civile_568/
771_1er_13158.html>.
51. See Jean-Luc Vallens, “La faillite internationale -
vers une loi modèle?” Petites Afﬁches 1996 no. 72, 21.
52. Treaties with Switzerland (15 June 1869), Belgium
(8 July 1899), Italy (3 June 1930), Monaco (13 Septem-
ber 1950) and Austria (27 February 1979).
53. From the Latin: “let it be executed.”
54. Article 509, New Code of Civil Procedure.
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for payment, attaching property and petitioning for insolvency, despite the exis-
tence of a foreign judgment. Furthermore, in the absence of speciﬁc legal recogni-
tion through the exéquatur procedure, a foreign judgment will encounter difﬁculties
with enforcement if doubts are raised as to its compliance with the rules of private
international law or general public order rules (which defendants or third parties
will undoubtedly raise as objections in the enforcement process).
Where there is no formal judgment, such as an out-of-court appointment of ad-
ministrators, a French court could look to the previous inclusion of these proce-
dures within Annex A of the Recast EIR as evidence of their regularity as far as
former law and procedure were concerned, which could add weight to any argu-
ments in favour of the continued recognition of the procedures in a post-Brexit sce-
nario. However, the absence of a formal judgment might constitute an impediment
to the exequatur process being engaged.
The procedure for the recognition of a foreign judgment follows the ordinary
rules of civil procedure and involves an application to the court by any interested
party, including the foreign ofﬁce-holder. The debtor must be cited to appear,
even if the foreign judgment was obtained ex parte.55 The court hearing the appli-
cation must content itself with an examination of the regularity of the foreign judg-
ment and that the public interest and legal system in France would not be offended
by the recognition of the judgment. The elements a court will look at in its exam-
ination include whether the foreign court had proper jurisdiction, whether the
proper law was applied, compliance with due process and public policy rules, in-
cluding whether the procedure was adversarial, and the absence of fraud.56 The
COMI issue noted earlier will also receive attention as part of this examination
process.
The civil process administered by the commercial courts is generally fast. More-
over, the recent establishment of specialist insolvency courts for the hearing of
large matters will further enhance the speed of hearings for cases within their pur-
view. Once the foreign judgment is recognised, the court will order that it receive
the exéquatur, the formal stamp of recognition. Once obtained, the foreign judg-
ment carries the same authority as a French judgment and is treated as res
judicata.57
The exéquatur will render the judgment capable of being enforced. More impor-
tantly, concurrent insolvency proceedings in France against the debtor may not be
initiated. The foreign ofﬁce-holder may take any steps permitted by foreign law to
carry out any act in France (with some exceptions), although the court will still re-
tain the discretion to supervise the ofﬁce-holder in the exercise of his functions and
may decide not to accord him automatic recognition of all his acts.58 Thus, while
the recognition of UK proceedings might be forthcoming, it is by no means certain
that all the effects of the judgment will be recognised automatically.
55. Cassation civile, 12 November 1986, Bull. Civ. I no.
257.
56. Cassation civile, 20 February 2007, Dalloz 2007,
324.
57. Grant of an exéquaturmust be advertised in the same
manner as any domestic judgment.
58. Cassation civile, 25 February 1986, JCP éd E 1987
No. 14969.
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VII. Germany59
In the absence of the provisions of the Recast EIR, the competence of the German
courts will be determined by Section 3 of the German Insolvency Code
(Insolvenzordnung – ‘InsO’).60 The German Insolvency courts will be competent to
exercise jurisdiction where the company’s centre of an independent commercial
activity (Mittelpunkt einer selbständigen wirtschaﬂichen Tätigkeit) is within the jurisdiction
of the German courts.61
Germany has not adopted The Model Law; therefore, answers relating to the
recognition of UK proceedings cannot be found therein.62 Several bilateral agree-
ments between Germany and other countries exist but do not include the UK.
Consequently, if the COMI of the company lies within the UK, the domestic pro-
visions on ‘German International Insolvency Rules’ (Sections 335 to 358 of the
InsO) will apply.63 The fundamental principle of lex fori concursus applies for inter-
national insolvencies just as it does for insolvencies regulated under the Recast
EIR; the insolvency law of the country in which the proceedings have been opened
applies.64
In contrast to the Recast EIR, there is no automatic recognition of foreign pro-
ceedings. The competence of the foreign courts to exercise jurisdiction is fully re-
viewable and has to be ascertained. Recognition in Germany will not be granted
if the foreign court that opened the proceedings did not have the competence to
exercise jurisdiction on the basis of German standards.65 This reﬂects the so-called
mirror-image principle (Spiegelbildprinzip);66 in other words, the German court will
examine whether the English court would have had the competence of exercising
jurisdiction if German law was to be applied when deciding jurisdictional compe-
tence.67 Recognition will also not be granted if it would lead to a breach of the fun-
damental principles of German law, especially to a breach of German fundamental
rights (Grundrechte).68
An insolvency proceeding with its COMI in the UK will only take effect in
Germany if, ﬁrst, the foreign proceeding qualiﬁes as an insolvency proceeding in
accordance with German law.69 The term ‘insolvency proceeding’ under Section
335 ff of the InsO does not necessarily have to be interpreted in the same way as
59. This section was provided by Dr Heike Lücke,
Kingston University.
60. Section 3, Insolvenzordnung (“InsO”) does not explic-
itly include foreign proceedings but applies by analogy.
See the English text, available at: <https://www.
gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_inso/index.html>.
61. Section 3, InsO.
62. Sven-Holger Undritz, in Karsten Schmidt (ed),
Kommentar zur Insolvenzordnung (19th edn) (C.H. Beck,
2016), Vorbemerkung Section 335 Insolvenzordnung,
recital 21.
63. BAG, Neue Zeitschrift für das Insolvenzrecht (2013) 758,
759.
64. Article 4, Recast EIR; Section 335, InsO; Annerose
Tashiro, in Eberhard Braun (ed), Kommentar zur
Insolvenzordnung (7th edn) (C.H. Beck, 2017), Section
335, recital 7–14.
65. Section 343, subsection 1, InsO.
66. Section 343, subsection 1, No. 1, InsO; Patrick
Ehret, in Braun, above note 64, Section 343, recital
9; BGHZ, 122,373.
67. German courts would normally follow the doctrine
of the CJEU in Case C328/12 Schmid v Hertel [2014]
EUECJ C-328/12 by applying Article 3, Recast EIR
to determine the international jurisdiction, thereby
the location of COMI is decisive.
68. Section 343, subsection 2, InsO; Ehret, above note
66, Section 343, recital 12.
69. Section 343, InsO; Undritz, above note 62,
Vorbemerkung Section 335 Insolvenzordnung, recital
6.
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under the Recast EIR. It is in general orientated towards determining whether the
proceeding in question has the aim of creditors’ satisfaction, in accordance with
Section 1 of the InsO. The procedures in Annex A of the Recast EIR could serve
as examples for the purpose of guidance for the German courts.
In regard to UK proceedings, a distinction has to be made between appoint-
ments made in-court and out-of-court. As far as an in-court administration pro-
ceeding70 is concerned, there is no doubt that the German courts would
recognise this procedure as an insolvency proceeding as interpreted under Section
343, subsection 1, of the InsO. The question is whether out-of-court appointments,
such as the appointment of an administrator under paragraph 22 of Schedule B1
of the Insolvency Act 1986, would be seen as insolvency proceedings in accordance
with Section 343, subsection 1, of the InsO. While the process can be completed
without the involvement of the courts, Section 343 of the InsO unambiguously re-
fers to opening decisions of ‘foreign courts’, and therefore, out-of-court proceed-
ings cannot be recognised under Section 343 of the InsO. A procedure without
any court involvement would also not be recognised under Section 328 of the Ger-
man Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung – ‘ZPO’) on the recognition of for-
eign judgments, due to the lack of a judgment by a court.71
Consequently, there is a lacuna in the German law in regard to proceedings that
can be implemented without any involvement of the court, including the out-of-
court administration procedure. As both of these procedures are mentioned in An-
nex A of the Recast EIR at present, it is conceivable that the German courts would
recognise them; however, up to now, German law has not provided for the possi-
bility of recognising such out-of-court procedures.72
There are further practical issues that need to be considered. There are in ex-
cess of 600 courts in Germany that deal with corporate insolvency matters. The
judges in these courts act alone and often in isolation. As a consequence, applica-
tion for recognition can be cumbersome, and there is a risk of judgments being in-
consistent. Furthermore, the insolvency practitioner needs to satisfy the court that
he has locus to represent the company in the proceedings. This requires appropriate
documentary evidence in addition to the issues raised above.
If a proceeding is recognised in Germany, all decisions of the foreign courts that
take action to secure the estate after opening of the proceedings will also be
recognised. This also applies to other measures of the foreign court that are taken
for the implementation or termination of the proceeding.73
Outside of the provisions of the Recast EIR, it will be easier for the German
courts to open a territorial insolvency proceeding (Partikularinsolvenzverfahren) for na-
tional assets. In contrast to Article 3(2) of the Recast EIR, which requires that the
70. Paragraph 12, Schedule B1, Insolvency Act 1986.
71. Zivilprozessordnung (Code of Civil Procedure). See
English text, available at: <https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_zpo/englisch_zpo.
html#p0044>.
72. On the recognition of schemes of arrangement, see
Reinhard Bork, “Germany” in The Implications of Brexit
for the Restructuring and Insolvency Industry, A Collection of
Essays (INSOL International, 2017), (The Implications of
Brexit) 51–54.
73. Section 343, subsection 2, InsO; Ehret, above note
66, Section 343, recital 14–16.
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debtor must have an establishment in Germany, Section 354 of the InsO only re-
quires that the debtor should have assets in Germany.
In summary, post-Brexit and on the assumption that the provisions of the Recast
EIR will not be applicable, insolvency proceedings of a debtor company with its
COMI in the UK will still in most cases be recognised in Germany under German
domestic law. There is a lacuna in the German regulations with regard to proce-
dures with no court involvement, however.
VIII. Ireland74
The legislative framework in the Republic of Ireland provides similar insolvency
processes to those available under UK legislation, including compulsory and vol-
untary liquidations, receiverships, and a debtor in possession rescue process known
as the Examinership process.75 In addition, Irish company law also contains provi-
sions that are similar to the UK Scheme of Arrangement provisions.76
The Irish High Court has jurisdiction to wind up any unregistered company, in-
cluding a company incorporated outside Ireland that has been carrying on busi-
ness in the State. Importantly, under Section 1417 of the Companies Act 2014,
an order ‘made for or in the course of winding up’ of a company incorporated out-
side Ireland by the courts of a country recognised by ministerial order under that
section may be enforced by the High Court ‘in the same manner in all respects as if
the order had been made by the High Court’.77 Essentially, winding up proceed-
ings initiated in prescribed states will be recognised by the Irish courts. An order
under Section 1417 may not be made in respect of other EU Member States (save
for Denmark), due to the presence of the Recast EIR.
It is noteworthy that only one such ministerial order was made in respect of the
predecessor to Section 1417, Section 250 of the Companies Act 1963. This
recognised Northern Ireland and Great Britain for the purposes of that section,
though was revoked following the introduction of the EIR 2000. Prior to this rev-
ocation, any compulsory winding up commenced in the UK was automatically
recognised in Ireland. There is no reason to suppose that such an order could
not be put in place again after the UK leaves the EU, though it must be
emphasised that this would require positive action by the Minister for Enterprise,
Trade and Employment. In such a situation, winding up proceedings initiated in
the UK would be automatically recognised in Ireland.
Looking beyond winding up proceedings, Ireland is not party to The Model
Law at present, although there are ongoing discussions concerning its adoption.
74. This section was provided by Professor Irene
Lynch-Fannon, University College Cork, with ac-
knowledgment to Dr Emilie Ghio, Birmingham City
University, and an unpublished paper by Noel
Rubotham presented to the Irish Company Law Re-
view Group.
75. See, generally, Irene Lynch Fannon and Gerard
Murphy, Corporate Insolvency and Rescue (2nd edn)
(Bloomsbury Professional, 2012).
76. Idem. See also Companies Act 2014; Irene Lynch
Fannon, “Insolvency and Rescue,” in Thomas
Courtney (ed), Bloomsbury’s Professionals Guide to the Com-
panies Act 2014 (Bloomsbury Professional, 2015). See
also chapter in the same work by Lyndon MacCann,
“Mergers and Acquisitions.”
77. Section 1417, Companies Act 2014. This is the
counterpart to Section 426, Insolvency Act 1986 (UK).
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Neither are there any relevant treaties to which the UK is a party. Recognition and
assistance of foreign insolvency proceedings not subject to the Recast EIR or Sec-
tion 1417 of the Companies Act 2014 (assuming the UK is recognised by ministe-
rial order as discussed above) would therefore be governed by the common law
rules of private international law in this area. These principles could apply to insol-
vency proceedings originating in the UK post-Brexit. There are few Irish cases in
this area, and so reliance can be placed on relevant English and other common law
case law.
The approach at common law in England to recognition of foreign insolvency
proceedings relevant to Ireland has been described by Fletcher as being ‘in a state
of arrested development for most of the [twentieth] century’.78 In the Irish context,
this is because of the application of Section 1417 of the Companies Act 2014 (and
its predecessor, Section 250 of the Companies Act 1963) and its counterpart in UK
law, Section 426 of the Insolvency Act 1986, together with the impact of the EIR
2000 and more recently the Recast EIR, all of which covered most instances of
cross-border insolvency. Nevertheless, the common law rules apply and the princi-
pal rule on the effect of a foreign winding up order is that ‘[t] he authority of a liq-
uidator appointed under the law of the place of incorporation is recognised in
England’79 and by analogy Ireland. This is similar to the rule in personal bank-
ruptcy law that is based on domicile, which in a company law context is deter-
mined by the place of incorporation.80
There are some exceptions where this rule is not followed, the most signiﬁcant
of which, is where the proceedings are not considered to be ﬁnal. Other excep-
tional situations where this rule might not be followed include where the proceed-
ings might be in breach of natural justice (which in Ireland might include
constitutional justice) or where the proceedings are contrary to public policy81 or
contrary to other principles of law of the jurisdiction. These are exceptional
situations.
The position in relation to recognition of collective proceedings falling short of a
winding up seems to be less clear. Earlier decisions in England and Canada indi-
cated that Chapter 11-type proceedings would not receive automatic recognition.
By analogy, this would apply to administration and company voluntary arrange-
ments from an Irish perspective. Although recognition of such proceedings would
not be automatic, following the Privy Council decision in Cambridge Gas Transport
Corporation v The Ofﬁcial Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings PLC and
others,82 it is possible that assistance could be given to such proceedings on the basis
that there was no suggestion of any prejudice to local creditors or any infringement
of a local law.
78. Ian Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law (1st
edn) (OUP, 1999), 93.
79. Lawrence Collins (ed), Dicey and Morris on the Conﬂict
of Laws (13th edn) (Sweet & Maxwell, 1999), 1141
(Rule 158).
80. Fletcher, above note 78, 166.
81. Article 26, Recast EIR, contains a similar public
policy exception that has been applied in Irish bank-
ruptcy proceedings in the McCann case in recent
times: ACC v McCann (Dunne J. ex tempore, High Court,
21st August 2012).
82. [2006] UKPC 26.
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The authority of Cambridge Gas was acknowledged by the Irish Supreme Court in
Re Flightlease (Ireland) Limited (In Voluntary Liquidation).83 Here, Finnegan J. noted
obiter that the decision in Cambridge Gas ‘represented a signiﬁcant change in the
common law in relation to bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, the full effects
of which are in the process of being worked out in subsequent cases’84 and
expressed a disinclination to follow the rule set out therein. O’Donnell J. on the
other hand stated in a concurring judgment that he would not wish to see this pos-
sibility ruled out, noting that the issue had not been fully argued in the present
case. He commented that he:
… would not wish to entirely rule out the possibility of the development of an insolvency
principle as a matter of common law as indeed was discussed by Lord Hoffman in The
Privy Council in [Cambridge Gas] and in the United Kingdom House of Lords in In re
HIH Insurance Ltd [2008] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 W.L.R. 852 and in the United
Kingdom Court of Appeal in Rubin v Euroﬁnance SA [2010] EWCA Civ 895, [2011]
Ch. 133.85
He did, however, express a preference for such change happening through leg-
islation. The UK Supreme Court subsequently delivered judgment in Rubin.86 The
view of the Irish Supreme Court remains the same: that the courts have recognised
the possibility of the development of a common law rule of recognition and at the
same time have expressed some preference for legislative intervention.
There is therefore a lack of certainty as to how proceedings commenced in the
UK will be recognised in Ireland in the absence of the Recast EIR, particularly
with regard to non-terminal proceedings. In any event, recognition will likely need
sanction of the court and will depend on the impact on local creditors.
IX. The Netherlands87
Brexit will have an impact on the recognition and effects in the Netherlands of in-
solvency proceedings opened in the UK. Until now, the Recast EIR (and before it,
the EIR 2000) has provided a clear and convincing framework to address cross-
border issues that may arise in insolvency proceedings that involve both the
Netherlands and the UK. In the absence of the clarity and predictability provided
by the Recast EIR, the effects of UK insolvency proceedings in the Netherlands
must be determined on the basis of Dutch rules of private international law. There
are no applicable conventions between the UK and the Netherlands, nor has the
Netherlands implemented legislation based on The Model Law, although this
83. [2012] 1 IR 722.
84. Ibid., paragraph 62 (judgment of Finnegan J).
85. Ibid., paragraph 9 (judgment of O’Donnell J).
86. [2012] UKSC 46.
87. This section is provided by Professor Michael
Veder, Radboud University Nijmegen. It is an
amended version of Michael Veder and Sijmen de
Ranitz, “The Netherlands,” in The Implications of Brexit
above note 72, 64–65.
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has been proposed in the past.88 This means that UK insolvency practitioners and
courts must (again) try to come to terms with the lack of a clear, coherent and
modern statutory framework in Dutch law for cross-border insolvencies.
Dutch domestic international insolvency law is largely based on case law, in
particular that of the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad).89 This case law, however,
does not provide for a coherent, clear and convincing set of rules either. Dutch law,
for example, still adheres to the outdated and troublesome territoriality principle in
order to determine the effects that foreign insolvency proceedings may have in the
Netherlands. Furthermore, many of the questions arising in a cross-border
insolvency context have not yet been addressed in litigation before the Hoge Raad,
leading to undesirable uncertainty.
In its decision of 13 September 2013 regarding the insolvency of the Russian oil
company Yukos, the Hoge Raad provided some clarity on the extent to which
foreign insolvency proceedings and the insolvency practitioners appointed in them
are recognised in the Netherlands.90 Importantly, recognition of foreign insolvency
proceedings in the Netherlands is automatic and does not require a court decision.
The Hoge Raad, however, conﬁrmed its longstanding adherence to the territoriality
principle, although at the same time mitigated the consequences thereof.
The Hoge Raad held that, insofar as an international regulation that is binding on
the Netherlands does not determine otherwise, insolvency proceedings opened in
another State have territorial effect. According to the court, this entails that the
legal effects of insolvency proceedings under the laws of the State where the
proceeding has been opened (lex concursus) cannot be invoked in the Netherlands
in so far as that would result in unpaid creditors no longer being able to take
recourse, either during or after the insolvency proceedings, against the assets of
the debtor that are situated in the Netherlands. However, the court also decided
that other legal effects attached to insolvency proceedings under the lex concursus,
including the powers of the insolvency practitioner to manage and dispose of the
debtor’s assets, in principle are recognised and given effect in the Netherlands.
This decision was helpful as it provided clarity in respect of what was, until then,
a controversial issue: whether a foreign insolvency practitioner can sell assets of the
debtor that are situated in the Netherlands. But many other important questions
88. In 2007, a proposal for a new Dutch Insolvency Act
was presented to the government by a (temporary) ad-
visory committee to the government and parliament on
insolvency law, the Commissie Insolventierecht. This draft
included proposals aimed at restyling Dutch interna-
tional insolvency law to meet internationally accept-
able standards and sought to facilitate an effective
and efﬁcient administration of cross-border insolvency
proceedings and further legal certainty. These pro-
posals, which were based on a combination of The
Model Law and the Recast EIR, have until now not
led to legislation. For a more elaborate exposé on these
proposals, see Bob Wessels, “International Insolvency
Law in the Netherlands: The Pre-Draft of Title 10”
(2008) 17(2) International Insolvency Review 143; Loes
Lennarts and Michael Veder, “The Dutch Domestic
Cross-border Insolvency Framework (and why it is
badly in need of Reform, illustrated by the Yukos Liti-
gation)” (2012) 4(2) International Insolvency Law Review
228. These proposals were discussed at a conference
in Leiden, for which see the report of conference pro-
ceedings in Bob Wessels and Paul Omar (eds), Crossing
(Dutch) Borders in Insolvency (INSOL Europe, 2009).
89. For an overview of Dutch domestic international in-
solvency law, see, inter alia, Michael Veder, Cross-Border
Insolvency Proceedings and Security Rights (Kluwer Law Inter-
national, 2004), Chapter II; Bob Wessels, International
Insolvency Law (4th edn) (Kluwer Law International,
2015), Chapter II.
90. HR 13 September 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:
BZ5668.
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remain unanswered. For example, it is unclear what the relevance is of the location
of the debtor’s COMI. Should a distinction similar to the Recast EIR and The
Model Law be made between foreign main and foreign non-main proceedings
when determining the scope of the foreign proceedings and the powers of foreign
liquidators appointed in them? And, if so, who should decide (and when) whether
the foreign proceedings were opened in the State of the debtor’s COMI? Unlike
the Recast EIR, Dutch domestic private international law also lacks a coherent
set of conﬂict of laws rules that determine the law applicable to a great number
of fundamental issues arising in a cross-border insolvency context. Even though
it is not unlikely that Dutch courts will, in principle, apply similar conﬂict of laws
rules to those laid down in the Recast EIR, more guidance and legal certainty
would be helpful.
The approach of the Dutch Hoge Raad to the effects of foreign insolvency
proceedings in the Netherlands, as set out above, creates substantial risks for the
administration of assets and a cross-border restructuring in UK insolvency
proceedings. In its Yukos judgment of 2013, the Hoge Raad has reconﬁrmed its
position that creditors can continue to take recourse against the debtor’s Dutch
assets, notwithstanding the insolvency proceedings opened abroad (unless the
Recast EIR applies). Consequently, a moratorium on creditor actions in UK
administration proceedings will not prevent creditors from attaching and taking
recourse against assets of the debtor that are situated in the Netherlands.
X. Spain91
The introduction of the EIR 2000 acted as a trigger for the reform of the outdated
Spanish insolvency regime and informed the cross-border insolvency model
enshrined in the Spanish Insolvency Act of 2003 (SIA).92 While the latter closely
follows many of the provisions now found in the Recast EIR, there are signiﬁcant
differences to the extent that it is meant to be applied to third countries, as the UK
will be post-Brexit. In particular, the provisions on recognition and enforcement
and on cooperation between insolvency proceedings could stop being applicable
if a third country does not systematically recognise Spanish judgments or cooper-
ate with Spanish proceedings.93 Reciprocity is not, however, strictly a basis for rec-
ognition or cooperation for matters endorsed by Spanish courts, which have only
reluctantly applied it, as it may infringe rights to access to justice and to a fair trial.
There is no automatic recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings like in the
Recast EIR. The recognition and enforcement of court orders opening foreign in-
solvency proceedings must proceed through exequatur before specialised commer-
cial courts to be recognised. Hence, the recognition of UK proceedings in Spain
will be more time-consuming and expensive than at present. Foreign insolvency
practitioners’ powers may be recognised prior to formal recognition of proceedings
91. This section was provided by Professor Laura
Carballo Piñeiro, World Maritime University.
92. Law 22/2003 of 9 July on Insolvency (“SIA”).
93. Ibid., Article 199.
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(whether provisional or not, court or out-of-court appointed),94 and they can also
apply for provisional measures, including the stay of individual enforcement
proceedings.95 SIA lists the usual grounds for non-recognition, including a public
order clause.96
While the foreign court order does not have to be ﬁnal for recognition of
proceedings to be commenced, it must open a collective proceeding based on
the debtor’s insolvency and by which its estate is submitted to the control or
supervision of a foreign court or administration for liquidation or reorganisation
purposes.97 Although this deﬁnition does not seem to encompass pre-insolvency
proceedings, SIA has been amended to include these. Therefore, this type of pro-
ceeding, including schemes of arrangement,98 is a likely candidate to be submitted
to the exequatur for recognition and enforcement in Spain.
Most notably, SIA requires the examination of the foreign court’s international
jurisdiction. Only those proceedings opened in a jurisdiction where the debtor has
its COMI or an establishment are to be recognised. The deﬁnitions of COMI and
establishment mirror those of the Recast EIR.99 However, there is a margin for
ﬂexibility in recognising foreign decisions, if a reasonable connection with the
country of origin, similar to those heads of jurisdiction such as the location of
signiﬁcant assets therein, is proven.100
The incorporation of a company in the UK may lead to the presumption that its
COMI is located there. While applying domestic rules on recognition and enforce-
ment, Spanish courts will need to recognise the UK company as such, in addition
to determining where its COMI is located. The ﬁrst operation is so far blocked by
the Court of Justice’s case law applying the principle of mutual recognition to
companies whose place of registered ofﬁce is seated in a Member State. Once that
case law is no longer applicable, Spanish courts will recognise UK companies
provided that they are properly incorporated under UK law and that its centre
of administration or principal place of business is not located in Spain.101 If the
latter is located in Spain, the company will be deemed a Spanish company and
it will face the problem of not having been properly incorporated under the
Spanish law.102 In such a scenario, a UK limited company will be held a Spanish
irregular company bereft of liability limitations. Hence, shareholders and directors
of such companies will be held also accountable vis-a-vis insolvency creditors. This
could pose signiﬁcant problems for companies incorporated in the UK but
operating substantially in Spain.
94. Ibid., Article 221.
95. Ibid., Article 226. The same provision entitles
Spanish courts to recognise provisional measures
adopted by foreign courts.
96. Ibid., Article 220.
97. See the deﬁnition in Article 220(1)(1), SIA.
98. The debate about how to classify schemes of ar-
rangement is open in Spain. See Laura Carballo
Piñeiro, “Brexit and International Insolvency beyond
the Reign of Mutual Trust” (2017) 28(3) International In-
solvency Review 246.
99. Article 8, SIA, establishes the international jurisdic-
tion of Spanish courts.
100. Ibid., Article 220(1)(3).
101. Article 9(11), Civil Code; Articles 8–9, Capital
Companies Law.
102. Article 39, Capital Companies Law.
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In line with the cross-border insolvency model endorsed by the Recast EIR and
The Model Law,103 a foreign insolvency proceeding will be granted universal or
territorial effects depending on the head of jurisdiction upon which it was opened.
With this limitation, and once recognised, the effects of foreign insolvency proceed-
ings in Spain are those of the country of commencement.104 In principle, they are
determined by the lex fori concursus, but the fact that assets are in Spain implies that
insolvency practitioners have to take into account the Spanish law. Moreover, if
they want to undertake speciﬁc acts and claims in Spain, they may be subject to
special conﬂict rules mirroring those laid down by the Recast EIR, such as those
dealing with third party security rights in rem or transaction avoidance.105
Further judgments on insolvency-related matters issued in foreign jurisdictions
will be automatically recognised in Spain if the foreign insolvency proceedings
have been previously recognised.106 Nevertheless, the grounds for non-recognition
will always need to be examined and the relevant counterparty may oppose their
recognition through the exequatur proceeding.
The cross-border insolvency model enshrined in SIA does not preclude the
opening of Spanish proceedings over the same debtor. This law lays down rules
on communication, cooperation and coordination between foreign and Spanish
insolvency proceedings. Interestingly, Spanish courts are already legally entitled
to conclude insolvency protocols.107 However, this power has not yet been used.
While the provisions in SIA bear similarity to the Recast EIR in many regards,
these rules cannot be compared in efﬁciency and effectiveness to those enshrined
in the Recast EIR, not to mention the fact that there are no provisions in SIA
on group company insolvency, as were introduced by the Recast EIR.
XI. ‘Hard’ Brexit: The Need for a Deal
The examples of the ﬁve key trading partners considered in this paper show a va-
riety of approaches in different Member States to the recognition of UK insolvency
proceedings in the event of a ‘no deal’ or ‘hard’ Brexit. The approach in these
Member States is far from consistent. In some cases, the basis and procedure for
recognition is set out in legislation, while in others, it will be necessary to look to
the common law. In either situation, it is evident that the law is not fully developed
and as such remains to be tested, which could give rise to more questions than an-
swers. In the most part, recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings will require
involvement of the courts. Insolvency practitioners may experience delays, costs
and potentially inconsistent responses as they address a range of different local re-
quirements in order to exercise their powers effectively. Then, once the proceed-
ings have been recognised, the rights and protections for local creditors vary
across the Member States, although these will generally prove more onerous for
the UK insolvency practitioners than under the Recast EIR. This uncertainty will
103. Article 220(2), SIA.
104. Ibid., Article 223.
105. Ibid., Articles 200–209.
106. Ibid., Article 222.
107. Ibid., Article 227.
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have a signiﬁcant impact on the conduct of insolvency proceedings with cross-bor-
der implications and the outcomes of these proceedings, potentially harming
returns to creditors, continuation of businesses, and the preservation of employ-
ment. In turn, this could undermine the current attractiveness of the UK as a place
in which to do business.108
The UK Government appears to recognise this danger. The future partnership
paper Providing a Cross-border Civil Judicial Cooperation Framework published in August
2017 sets out the intention to:
seek an agreement with the EU that allows for close and comprehensive cross-border
civil judicial cooperation on a reciprocal basis, which reﬂects closely the substantive
principles of cooperation under the current EU framework.109
This position was reiterated in the House of Commons on 5 April 2018, with
the response to a written question to the Secretary of State for Business, Energy
and Industrial Strategy:
The exact future relationship between the EU and UK on civil judicial cooperation,
including the recognition of insolvency and restructuring procedures, judgments and
Insolvency Practitioner qualiﬁcations is subject to negotiations with our EU partners.
It is in the interests of the UK and the EU that there continues to be an effective, and
ﬁt for purpose, framework for resolving cross-border legal disputes. The Government
has made clear that an effective framework of civil judicial cooperation is an important
part of the deep and special partnership we want to establish with the EU.110
This stance is developed in subsequent publications. The presentation Framework
for the UK–EU Partnership: Civil Judicial Cooperation, published by the Department for
Exiting the European Union on 13 June 2018, sets out that the UK Government
intends to seek a bilateral treaty that recognises the UK as a third country while at
the same time recognising ‘the close and continuing ties between our citizens and
our businesses’.111 This position is reiterated in the UK Government’s White
Paper The Future Relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union
published on 12 July 2018, the so-called Chequers Agreement, which calls for a
bilateral treaty to cover a package of rules, including insolvency.112 This need
for effective cooperation for effective future relationships between the UK and
the EU post-Brexit is relevant to all aspects of the Brexit negotiations. Many signif-
icant issues remain unresolved following conclusion of the March 2018 round
of negotiations,113 just 7 months before a ﬁnal deal was due to be agreed ahead
of the UK’s anticipated departure from the EU in March 2019.
108. See Insolvency and Corporate Governance, above note 2,
5.
109. Judicial Cooperation Future Partnership Paper,
above note 4, paragraph 19.
110. HC Deb 5 April 2018 C134602 W (Answer pro-
vided by Andrew Grifﬁths MP, Parliamentary Under-
Secretary, Department for Business, Energy and In-
dustrial Strategy).
111. Framework Presentation, above note 17, 17.
112. Department for Exiting the European Union, The
Future Relationship between the United Kingdom and the Euro-
pean Union (Cm 9593), paragraph 148.
113. EU Draft Withdrawal Agreement, above note 21,
35.
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Recognition of outbound proceedings is not solely an issue that will impact
on the UK and companies with their COMIs there. It cannot be ignored that
there should be reciprocal concerns for the remaining EU Member States if
the UK does not continue to beneﬁt from the provisions of the Recast EIR.
The potential loss of trade and business operations of UK companies together
with loss of employment of Member State nationals either directly or in the
UK supply chain will be detrimental to the remaining Member States.
Increased costs and difﬁculties in preserving business operations, due to poten-
tial delays in recognition of UK insolvency proceedings, will also reduce poten-
tial returns for creditors, through both lower realisations and higher expenses.
This will impact on local creditors, even where local protection measures are
in place; they may gain immediate beneﬁts of priority repayment but will lose
the longer-term beneﬁts of continued trade.
Should a ‘hard’ Brexit entail no agreement on the continuation of reciprocal
arrangements under the Recast EIR, there will no doubt be an inclination for
the UK Government to use the powers under Section 8 of the Withdrawal Act
to reverse the enactment of the Recast EIR into UK law. There is some logic in
this: why automatically recognise inbound insolvency proceedings commenced in
the remaining Member States, when such approach would not be reciprocated
with regard to outbound proceedings? It could be argued, however, that incorpo-
rating the Recast EIR into UK law could prove beneﬁcial, even without immedi-
ate reciprocity. If the UK is to rely on the private international law of individual
Member States for recognition of insolvency proceedings post-Brexit, engendering
goodwill could prove all important to encourage both timely and efﬁcient recogni-
tion. The examples considered above identiﬁed requirements of reciprocity from
remaining Member States to some extent, such as seen in Ireland and Spain.
Furthermore, automatic recognition of insolvency proceedings in other Member
States by the UK may encourage adoption and engagement with the EU JudgeCo
Principles by Member States’ judiciary when considering UK proceedings. While
recognition of UK insolvency proceedings would not be frictionless, the process
could certainly be made much smoother. With Member States able to beneﬁt from
the UK’s adoption of The Model Law together with various other established
means for recognition and cooperation, it is arguable that the UK has nothing
to lose by adopting the Recast EIR on an inbound-only basis.
XII. Conclusion
The potential outcome does not look promising should the UK leave the EU with-
out having reached a deal on the future regulation of cross-border insolvency pro-
ceedings. The UK would cease to enjoy the beneﬁts of the Recast EIR, including
automatic recognition of UK insolvency proceedings and insolvency practitioners’
powers across the EU, irrespective of whether the Recast EIR is incorporated into
UK law through the Withdrawal Act. With both sides adopting the approach that
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‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’,114 the prospect of no deal being
reached appears to be very real.
The EU has indicated that the current arrangements will cease to apply to UK
proceedings initiated after the proposed transition period comes to an end. While
the UK Government seemingly recognises the importance of maintaining the status
quo, albeit within a different relationship and without the oversight of the CJEU, its
position on and approach to Brexit negotiations appears to be in a state of ﬂux,
with little evidence of agreed approach within government. This is apparent in
the lack of clear guidance provided by the UK Government to date. The published
documentation, including the future partnership paper Providing a Cross-border Civil
Judicial Cooperation Framework and the presentation Framework for the UK–EU
Partnership: Civil Judicial Cooperation, is aspirational and speculative, in sharp contrast
to the approach of the EU and the legislative basis of the EU Draft Withdrawal
Agreement.
In the absence of any alternative overarching instrument, recognition of UK-
initiated insolvency proceedings will be subject to the private international law of
individual Member States. It can be said with conﬁdence that the approach across
different Member States will not be consistent; in some instances, it will be unclear
because of a lack of statutory provision or developed jurisprudence; and whether
recognition is automatic or not, there will likely be signiﬁcant cost and time impli-
cations for insolvency practitioners seeking to exercise their powers. Furthermore,
proceedings will be subject to more local law restrictions, and in some cases even
protections, than is the case at present. This would represent a signiﬁcant depar-
ture from the current arrangements and would likely be an impediment to the
rescue of these companies, which would result in considerable detriment to
creditors, particularly in terms of the returns available.
The UK currently prides itself on having a stable and reliable business environ-
ment that is attractive to external investors. In the post-Brexit landscape, this
attraction will be more important than ever as the UK seeks to expand its trading
relationships with states beyond the EU membership. As the date for Brexit draws
nearer, and with the UK Government’s apparent desire to have the ability to leave
the EU without a deal to boost its negotiating position, the prospects of a ‘hard
Brexit’ are very real. This paper has shown that such an outcome would create
signiﬁcant uncertainty—uncertainty for businesses, uncertainty for creditors
and uncertainty for investors— that will impact on all Member States and their cit-
izens. While some larger businesses may be able to avoid some of the problems
with recognition of proceedings identiﬁed in this paper by managing their corpo-
rate structures, for example, by incorporating subsidiaries in one or more other
Member States, this approach will not be viable, or even possible, for all
companies.
114. EU Guidelines, above note 20, paragraph 2;
Prime Minister’s statement to the House of Commons
on negotiations for the UK’s departure from the
European Union, HC Deb 11 December 2017, vol
633, cols 25–28 at col 26.
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It is of crucial importance, both for the UK and the remaining Member States,
that agreement is reached on this issue of far-reaching importance. Any hiatus will
cause uncertainty and unnecessary disruption, with potentially signiﬁcant effects
for the UK and remaining Member States. This will impact negatively on both
sides; while foreign direct investment in the UK from the EU and beyond is
predicted to decline,115 the economies of the remaining Member States are
expected to contract as a result of Brexit.116 In the event of a ‘no deal’ Brexit,
the only winners will be professional advisers trying to assist stakeholders in
navigating these uncertain waters. But at what cost to the economies of the UK
and the remaining Member States and entrepreneurial activity therein? The
failure to ﬁnd a solution for the consistent recognition of UK insolvency proceed-
ings in other Member States post-Brexit will likely limit the number of Member
States with which the UK can sensibly do business, due to the different approaches
being adopted and the uncertainty arising therefrom.
115. See, for example, Swati Dhingra et al., The Impact
of Brexit on Foreign Investment in the UK (CEP London,
2017), available at: <http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/down-
load/brexit03.pdf>.
116. See, for example, International Monetary Fund,
Country Report No. 18/224: Euro Area Policies (July
2018), available at: <http://www.imf.org/~/media/
ﬁles/publications/cr/2018/cr18224.ashx>.
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